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BEARD V. BANKS:  
RESTRICTED READING, REHABILITATION, 
AND PRISONERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
Anna C. Burns*
When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does 
not lose his human quality; his mind does not become 
closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a 
free and open interchange of opinions; his yearning for 
self-respect does not end; nor is his quest for self-
realization concluded . . . It is the role of the First 
Amendment and this Court to protect those precious 
personal rights by which we satisfy such basic yearnings 
of the human spirit.1
INTRODUCTION 
Punishment, sentencing, prison: the very act of removing an 
individual from society implies deprivation.2 Though prisoners 
may be subject to regulation, they do not lose their basic human 
rights. Based upon years of prisoners’ challenges to regulation 
of their First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court has 
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.A., Skidmore College, 2003. 
The author wishes to thank her family, Mary Jane, Leslie, and Laurel Burns, 
as well as Benjamin Godsill, for their love and support throughout law 
school. She would also like to thank her close friends for constant 
encouragement, and the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their 
editorial help. 
1 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
concurring), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 104 (1989). 
2 Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). 
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developed a framework to review such challenges, equally 
respectful of the goals of prison administration and the 
preservation of rights. As most recently applied in Beard v. 
Banks, however, the framework loses sight of this balance, 
suggesting that prisoners may ultimately be deprived of future 
protection. 
Deprivation of prisoners’ First Amendment freedoms was 
first analyzed by the Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez,3 
a case involving personal correspondence between inmates and 
the underlying administrative censorship procedures to maintain 
safety. 4 While stressing the importance of the freedom to 
communicate, the Court noted that “some latitude is . . . 
essential to the proper discharge of an administrator’s duty. But 
any regulation or practice that restricts inmate correspondence 
must be generally necessary to protect one or more . . . 
legitimate governmental interests.”5
Then, in 1987, in Turner v. Safley,6 the Supreme Court 
provided a more in-depth analysis of its standard of review, 
noting that if a “prison regulation impinges on inmates’ 
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests.”7 Furthermore, the 
Court established a four-factor test, looking towards (1) 
rationality, (2) whether any alternatives remained open to 
prisoners, (3) the impact of the freedom on the general prison 
population, and (4) whether there was a less restrictive 
alternative.8
While the Turner structure has been successfully applied in 
cases involving censorship or deprivation of letters,9 content-
specific newspapers or magazines,10 literature discussing 
3 Procunier, 416 U.S. 396. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 414. 
6 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
7 Id. at 89. 
8 Id. at 89-91. 
9 Abbott v. Meese, 824 F.2d 1166 (1987). 
10 Id. 
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sexuality,11 and regulation of visitors to prisons,12 all of these 
cases hinged upon the importance of maintaining order and 
security within the prison system. As Turner illustrated, if the 
censorship or limitation is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests, then claims of safety have found both 
support and deference in the courts.13
However, the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Beard v. 
Banks14 presents a question as to the continuing validity of the 
Turner test. In Banks, inmates in the “most restrictive level” of 
a Pennsylvania prison were not allowed access to newspapers, 
magazines, or personal photographs.15 All inmates in the prison 
were initially placed in this most restrictive level and therefore 
deprived of access to these items upon arrival.16 Although some 
inmates eventually progressed into a less restrictive area of the 
prison, “in practice most [did] not.”17 That is, most prisoners 
continued to face severe restrictions on their access to visitors, 
phone calls, and commissary,18 and were additionally denied 
access to newspapers, magazines, and personal photographs.19
Reviewing the justification of the regulation, the Supreme 
Court relied on the Pennsylvania Prison Secretary’s belief that 
such deprivation was necessary “to motivate better behavior on 
the part of [these] particularly difficult prisoners, by providing 
them with an incentive”20 to change levels in the prison, and to 
“discourage backsliding.”21 Not wanting to appear as if it were 
11 Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ind. 2005). 
12 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003). 
13 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91-93 (1987). 
14 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006). 
15 Id. at 2575. 
16 See id. at 2576. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. These limitations should be viewed in concert with the denial of 
prisoner access to television and radio in all levels of LTSU as well as within 
other units of the prison. Id.  
20 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2578-79 (2006). 
21 Id. at 2579 (citing Brief of Appellant at 26, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. 
Ct. 2572 (2006)). 
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deferring to administrators without applying the balancing test, 
the Court danced through the Turner analysis with decidedly 
little interest. Accepting the musings of prison officials as fact, 
the Court found the regulations necessary and reasonable. Yet, 
because the justification was rehabilitation, the Court’s use of 
the Turner test appeared “poorly suited” to the task, unable to 
strike a real balance between deprivation and constitutional 
freedoms.22
The limitation was upheld. Deferential review paved the way 
for the approval of a restriction which imposes severe limits on 
prisoners’ First Amendment freedoms—limits conditioned solely 
upon incarceration and which are likely to continue for the term 
of a sentence.23 While the administrators’ goals of maintaining 
control over prisoner behavior, minimizing property in cells, 
and ensuring safety24 are logical and rational, it does not 
automatically follow that the restrictions on access to 
newspapers, magazines and personal photographs are reasonably 
related or tailored to those goals.25 The Court, however, 
accepted the goal of rehabilitation without acknowledging the 
faulty tailoring. 
Part I of this Comment examines the development of the 
Turner test and its importance in evaluating challenges to 
deprivation of prisoners’ First Amendment rights. Part II 
illustrates successful application of the test in various First 
Amendment cases involving prisoner access to certain writing 
and reading materials. Part III then addresses the specifics of 
Beard v. Banks, focusing on the misapplication of the Turner 
test. Finally, Part IV explores the policy implications of Banks, 
addressing the deprivation/rehabilitation theory espoused by the 
prison officials, and concludes with a call for greater scrutiny in 
the courts, as well as local action on the part of legislators and 
prison administrators, to ensure the preservation of prisoners’ 
fundamental rights. 
22 Id. at 2584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
23 See id. at 2576. 
24 Id. at 2578. 
25 Id. at 2586-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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I.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURNER TEST 
This Part examines the foundational case law of prisoners’ 
First Amendment rights and the evolution of the Turner test. 
Section A considers Procunier v. Martinez,26 the inaugural case 
involving prisoners’ First Amendment rights. Section B 
examines Procunier’s progeny, a line of cases emphasizing the 
need for alternative means of expression and the importance of 
deferential review. Finally, Section C reviews Turner and 
frames the resulting four-part test. This section concludes with a 
discussion of Justice Stevens’ dissent, suggesting that the Turner 
standard is not as reliable or well-crafted as the majority 
assumed. 
A.  First Amendment Prisoner Rights in Procunier v. 
Martinez27
The Supreme Court first addressed First Amendment rights 
of prisoners in the 1974 case of Procunier v. Martinez.28 In 
Procunier, prisoners challenged state prison policies regarding 
censorship and monitoring of inmate correspondence. Certain 
prison regulations prohibited inmates from “writ[ing] letters in 
which they ‘unduly complain[ed]’ or ‘magnif[ied] 
grievances,’”29 or expressing “inflammatory political, racial, 
religious or other views or beliefs. . .,”30 as well as discussing 
criminal mischief, or “otherwise inappropriate” items.31 Where 
enforcement was concerned, however, there was little guidance 
for prison officials as to how the inmate correspondence should 
26 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 399 (citing California Department of Corrections Director’s 
Rule 1201). 
30 Id. (citing California Department of Corrections Director’s Rule 
1205). 
31 Id. at 400 (citing California Department of Corrections Director’s 
Rule 2402(8)). 
ANNA.DOC 7/1/2007 10:58 PM 
1230 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
                                                          
be reviewed.32
Articulating the first standard of review for limitations on 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court 
expressed some hesitation about intruding into the realm of 
prison administration.33 However, the Court made it clear that 
consistency was desperately needed to define the permissible 
reach of judicial review within the prison system.34 Addressing 
the issue of censorship in a broader context, the Court looked 
not only at the denial of the prisoners’ right of free expression 
under the First Amendment, but also at the effect of the denial 
on those with whom the inmate was corresponding.35 Drawing 
on a previous First Amendment case,36 the Court articulated a 
new two-part analysis for cases specifically dealing with 
32 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 400 (1974). 
33 Id. at 404. 
34 Id. at 406-08. 
35 Id. at 408-10. 
36 The previous First Amendment case referred to is United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O’Brien involved governmental restrictions on 
free speech. O’Brien burned his selective service registration certificate on 
courthouse steps in demonstration of his feelings toward the military draft and 
the Vietnam War. In addressing O’Brien’s actions, the Court noted that even 
though O’Brien was using free expression, the First Amendment did not act 
as an ultimate shield allowing all behaviors. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. 
   Realizing that government regulations would inevitably touch free 
speech and the First Amendment from time to time, the court created a four-
part test to review such restrictions. Id. at 376-78. First, the restriction may 
be sufficiently justified if it is within the government’s power. Id. Second, 
the restriction will have support if it furthers an important or substantial 
government interest. Id. Third, the restriction should not be related to the 
suppression of expression. Id. Finally, the restriction should be no greater 
than is necessary to accomplish the governmental objective. Id. 
   Reviewing O’Brien within the context of Procunier, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that Procunier also involved governmental regulations, unrelated 
to the suppression of expression, but that impinged on First Amendment 
rights nonetheless. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 410-14. Recognizing that the test 
in O’Brien was best suited for situations in which individuals were not 
constrained or isolated from society, the court then formulated a new test in 
Procunier based loosely on two of the important factors in O’Brien. Id. at 
413-14. 
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suppression of prisoners’ freedom of expression.37 First, any 
restriction imposed by prison officials must “further an 
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the 
suppression of expression. . .” and second, the limitation may 
not extend too far, but rather, must be only what is “necessary 
or essential to the protection of the particular governmental 
interest involved.”38 The Court noted that the regulations 
provided no guidance to prison officials concerning how or what 
to look for in censoring correspondence, and that there was little 
justification for the furtherance of any penological interest.39 
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the invalidation of the 
regulations.40
B.  The Lead-Up to Turner 
Over the next decade, armed with the Procunier framework, 
the Court addressed a variety of inmates’ First Amendment 
cases. Beginning with Pell v. Procunier,41 the Court began to 
view the presence of alternative means of expression with 
heightened importance. Similarly, deference to prison 
administrators who dealt with inmates on a day-to-day basis 
weighed more heavily in the analysis. In the following section, 
the cases of Pell, Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Union,42 Bell v. 
Wolfish,43 and Block v. Rutherford,44 illustrate the evolution of 
Procunier, culminating in the Turner framework. 
37 Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413-14. 
38 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974). 
39 Id. at 415-16. 
40 Id. 
41 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
42 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
43 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
44 468 U.S. 576 (1984). 
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1.  Pell v. Procunier—1974 
In Pell v. Procunier, the Supreme Court addressed prisoners’ 
claims that regulations prohibiting them from engaging in face-
to-face media interviews amounted to an unlawful infringement 
on their freedom of expression.45 Under the first prong of 
Procunier, the Court noted that limiting visits from strangers 
was clearly related to important governmental interests of prison 
safety, deterrence of crime, and rehabilitation.46 Indeed, all 
three interests were threatened when strangers were allowed 
face-to-face contact with inmates, as such visits often led to 
disciplinary problems.47
Addressing the second Procunier factor, narrow tailoring of 
the restriction, the Court in Pell reasoned that the limitation of 
expression in face-to-face media interviews should not be 
assessed in an isolated context, but instead viewed in connection 
with possible alternative forms of expression available to 
inmates.48 It was clear to the Court that alternatives did exist. 
Because inmates were able to express their views through the 
mail and personal visits with friends and family, they had not 
been totally deprived or censored in their expression.49 Indeed, 
the Court noted that “although [security concerns] would not 
permit prison officials to prohibit all expression or 
communication by prison inmates, security considerations are 
sufficiently paramount in the administration of the prison to 
justify the imposition of some restrictions on the entry of 
outsiders into the prison for face-to-face contact with inmates.”50 
The analysis in Pell, therefore, added a third factor to be 
considered alongside the two articulated in Procunier, namely, 
45 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
46 Id. at 822-23. 
47 Id. at 831-32. 
48 Id. at 823. 
49 Id. at 824-25. 
50  Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974). 
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the availability of alternatives to prisoners.51
2.  Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union—1977 
The Procunier test was again applied in Jones v. N.C 
Prisoners’ Labor Union.52 At issue were regulations prohibiting 
inmates from joining or meeting as a prison union, and 
forbidding the delivery of packets sent to inmates from outside 
union organizers.53 Emphasizing the realities of operating a 
prison system, the Court looked to Procunier and the importance 
of affording deference to prison officials.54 Under the first prong 
of Procunier, the Court addressed the importance of the 
governmental interest involved. Relying on correctional officers’ 
testimony that prisoner unions created added tension between 
prisoners and prison officials and increased the likelihood of 
riots, work stoppages, and misuse of influence amongst other 
prisoners,55 the Court noted that “the ban on inmate solicitation 
and group meetings . . . was rationally related to the reasonable, 
indeed to the central, objectives of prison administration.”56
Regarding the prohibition against bulk mailing from outside 
union organizers,57 under the second prong of Procunier, the 
Court recognized that the prohibition limited prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights. However, it reasoned that although bulk 
mailing was restricted, there were alternative means by which 
outside union organizers could communicate with prisoners.58 
Again, as in Pell, the need for alternative forms of expression 
was emphasized. So long as the prison was not limiting all 
avenues of communication between prisoners and outside union 
organizers, then the restriction on bulk mailing did not go too 
51 Id. at 823. 
52 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
53 Id. at 121. 
54 Id. at 126. 
55 Id. at 127. 
56 Id. at 129. 
57 Id. at 130-31. 
58 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 130-31 (1977). 
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far in the context of the second prong of Procunier.59
The Court then turned to the restrictions on “inmate-to-
inmate solicitation of membership [in unions],”60 and the 
prohibition on prisoner union meetings. Here, unlike the 
restriction on bulk mailings, the Court did not find a violation of 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights.61 Instead, the Court noted 
the importance of the government interest involved—the need for 
prison management and organization—and concluded that 
“numerous associational rights are necessarily curtailed by the 
realities of confinement.”62 Prisoners’ unions would no doubt 
create difficulties for prison officials in maintaining order and 
peace among inmates.63 The Court found these to be reasonable 
objectives under Procunier, concluding “the regulations [were] 
drafted no more broadly than they [needed] to be to combat the 
perceived threat stemming directly from group meetings and 
organizational activities of the Union.”64 Jones thus represents a 
clear application of the Procunier test, while also highlighting 
the need for alternative means of expression when prisoners’ 
First Amendment rights are infringed. 
3.  Bell v. Wolfish—1979 
Straightforward application of Procunier and an emphasis on 
alternative means of expression is also illustrated by Bell v. 
Wolfish, a case involving restrictions placed on pre-trial 
detainees’ receipt of, among other things, hardcover books.65 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 131. 
61 Id. at 131-32. 
62 Id. at 132. 
63 Id. 
64 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 133 (1977). 
65 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520 (1979). Generally, prison officials 
were concerned about security and administrative issues when inmates 
received bound items from individuals outside of prison. Id. at 549. 
Hardcover books posed a specific problem as, before they would be 
distributed to inmates, prison officials would need to ensure that the books 
did not contain drugs, money, or weapons. Id. This in turn required a 
ANNA.DOC 7/1/2007 10:58 PM 
 PRISONERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 1235 
                                                          
Specifically, pre-trial detainees were subject to a “publisher-
only” rule, and only allowed to receive books and magazines 
mailed directly from an outside publisher or bookstore.66 Under 
the first part of Procunier, the Court referred to the prison 
warden’s affidavit that “‘serious’ security and administrative 
problems were caused when bound items were received by 
inmates from unidentified sources outside the facility.”67 As the 
mailing of books (particularly hardcover) from outside 
individuals increased the possibility that contraband could be 
smuggled into the prison, the Court affirmed the restriction as 
rational.68
Reviewing the second Procunier requirement, the Court 
noted that the specific limitation on hardcover books did not 
appear overly broad,69 and concluded that “the considered 
judgment of [prison officials] must control in the absence of 
prohibitions far more sweeping than those involved here.”70 The 
Court also emphasized that ready alternatives existed for inmates 
to access reading materials: books and magazines could be sent 
directly from publishers, bookstores, or book clubs,71 and 
inmates also had access to the correctional center’s library of 
over 3,000 hardcover and 5,000 paperback books.72 Applying 
Procunier to the restriction at issue, the Court found legitimate 
reasons for the restriction as well as several alternatives for 
prisoners’ First Amendment expression. 
thorough search of the books, where the covers would be removed and the 
pages individually leafed through. Id. 
66 Id. at 548-49. The prison officials reasoned that the burden of leafing 
through pages and removing book covers would not be necessary if books 
were sent directly by the publishers, as there would be an extremely low 
probability that a publisher would send contraband. Id. at 549. 
67 Id. at 549. 
68 Id. at 550-51. 
69 Id. at 551. 
70 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 552 (1979). 
71 Id. at 551. 
72 Id. at 552 n.33. 
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4.  Block v. Rutherford—1984 
Block v. Rutherford, like Bell, also involved claims brought 
by pre-trial detainees,73 and further changed the landscape of 
Procunier by re-framing the first prong of the test. Rutherford 
involved a ban on contact visits for pre-trial detainees, which the 
detainees argued constituted a violation of their due process 
rights.74 Instead of asking whether the regulation furthered an 
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the 
suppression of expression, the Court inquired only as to whether 
the prohibition was “reasonably related to the security of the 
facility” as justified by the prison administration.75 Refusing to 
delve too far into the rationale behind the restriction, the Court 
found it obvious that contact visits created the potential for 
internal security problems.76
The Court next turned to an analysis under the second prong 
of Procunier. Unlike the courts below, the Supreme Court 
rejected the idea that the restriction was impermissibly excessive 
in relation to the security concerns proffered by the prison 
administrators.77 Focusing instead on the difficulty of functional 
73 Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984). 
74 Id. at 578. Specifically, the pre-trial detainees were prohibited from 
touching spouses, relatives, and friends. Id. The detainees were, however, 
permitted “unmonitored non-contact visits” for twelve hours a day. Id. These 
non-contact visits involved an inmate sitting on one side of a clear glass 
panel, with the visitor on the other side. Id. The parties were able to 
communicate through a telephone but could not physically touch. Id. 
75 Id. at 586. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 587. In addressing the detainees’ claims regarding visitation 
restrictions, the district court had recognized that “to allow unrestricted 
contact visitation would add greatly to the Sheriff’s security problems and 
reduce the number of allowable visits. On the other hand, it is equally 
obvious that the ability of a man to embrace his wife and his children from 
time to time during the weeks or months while he is awaiting trial is a matter 
of great importance to him.” 457 F. Supp. 104, 110 (C.D. Cal. 1978). The 
district court went on to emphasize the importance of evaluating prisoners 
when they first arrive, and classifying the prisoners accordingly. Id. Those 
prisoners that presented the greatest security threats could indeed be denied 
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alternatives and the resulting burdens on administrators, the 
Court dismissed the need to use less restrictive means.78 
Specifically, the Court noted that the “burdens of identifying 
candidates for contact visitation. . . [were] made even more 
difficult by the brevity of detention and the constantly changing 
nature of the inmate population.”79 Furthermore, there was great 
potential for problems if certain detainees were allowed visits 
while others were denied the same privileges.80 The Court 
concluded that the “blanket prohibition” on contact visits was 
“an entirely reasonable, non-punitive response to the legitimate 
security concerns identified.”81 Thus, unlike Pell, Jones, and 
Bell, the Court did not hesitate to uphold the restriction even 
though it affected all prisoners uniformly and failed to provide 
any alternative means of visitation. Instead, under the second 
prong of Procunier, the Court justified the limitation as only 
going as far as necessary to protect prison safety.82
Examination of Pell, Jones, and Bell illustrates the 
importance of deference to prison officials, while also 
highlighting the Court’s retreat from the idea that alternative 
means of expression are always required. Taken together, these 
cases suggest that if a restriction is necessary and essential to 
protect penological interests, it may be deemed valid even if no 
visitation for safety reasons. Id. However, for those low-risk inmates, the 
court reasoned it would be proper to allow one visit per week. Id. The goal 
was to treat “inmates with reasonable humanity without unduly increasing the 
problems of security.” Id. 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s analysis, noting 
that “the institution’s security interests do not always predominate. A blanket 
restriction on contact visits for all detainees may present an unreasonable, 
exaggerated response to security concerns at a particular facility.” 710 F.2d 
572, 577 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit approved of the district court’s 
order for minimal visits, noting that if the prisoners did not raise security 
concerns, then there would be no sense in depriving them of contact visits. 
Id. 
78 Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587-88 (1984). 
79 Id. at 587. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 588. 
82 Id. 
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alternative means of expression are available. 
C.  Turner v. Safley83
By 1987, the Supreme Court, as well as lower courts across 
the country, had dealt with numerous cases involving the 
restriction of prisoners’ First Amendment rights.84 Turner v. 
Safley represented an important shift in the Court’s analysis of 
such cases, and resulted in a new framework, replacing that of 
Procunier. 
In Turner, prisoners brought two challenges to prison 
regulations: one dealing with First Amendment rights, the other 
concerning the constitutional right to marry.85 Specifically, 
prison regulations prohibited inmates from corresponding with 
83 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
84 See infra Parts IA and IB, with reference to Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U.S. 396 (1974) (holding that correspondence between inmates can be 
limited); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (finding face-to-face media 
interviews were permissibly limited); Jones v. N.C. Carolina Prisoners’ 
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (upholding ban on prison inmate solicitation and 
sending of bulk packages); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding 
restriction that inmates may only receive books and magazines mailed directly 
from publishers); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (holding contact 
visits for pre-trial detainees can be limited). See also, Abdul Wali v. 
Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding prisons cannot deny 
prisoners access in receiving reports on prison conditions without justification 
of penological interests); Shabazz v. O’Lone, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(holding prisons cannot restrict prisoners from attending weekly religious 
services unless prison shows that restriction serves important security 
purposes); Vester v. Rogers, 795 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding prison 
may prohibit correspondence between prisoners); Taylor v. Sternett, 532 
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding prison officials may not open inmates’ 
correspondence with attorneys, probation officers, governmental agencies, 
and the press unless there is a reasonable possibility that contraband is 
included in the mail); Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(finding regulation that prohibits prisoners’ from having any photographs or 
paintings of nudes is impermissibly broad); United States v. Baumgarten, 517 
F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1975) (screening inmates’ mail is permissible if 
regulation is for security purposes and goes no further than necessary).
85 See generally, Turner, 482 U.S. 78. 
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one another, and banned inmate marriages in the absence of 
prior prison approval.86 Confirming the prisoners’ right under 
Procunier to petition for review of the letter-writing restrictions, 
Justice O’Connor noted that “prison walls do not form a barrier 
separating prison inmates from the protections of the 
Constitution.”87 However, in the same breath, the Court 
emphasized the importance of cautious judicial review of prison 
regulations.88
Before proceeding to examine the regulations at issue, the 
Court articulated a more exacting standard of review than the 
one first pronounced in Procunier, holding that “when a prison 
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the 
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”89 The Court then laid out a four-part test 
to be used in analyzing the regulation, its impacts, and possible 
alternatives. 
First, addressing the need for logic and objectivity, there 
must be “a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison 
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put 
forward.”90 Additionally, the Court acknowledged that Pell91 
and Bell92 required that the asserted penological interest be 
neutral and objective, and not content based.93
Second, the Court noted that the existence of alternative 
forms of expression for prisoners should also be considered in 
assessing the deprivation of rights.94 Because regulations and 
restrictions should not be viewed in isolation, if one mode of 
86 Id. at 81-82. 
87 Id. at 84. 
88 Id. at 85. 
89 Id. at 89. 
90 Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). 
91 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974). 
92 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551 (1979). 
93 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). 
94 Id. at 90. The Court focused on Pell’s contribution to this idea of 
alternative channels of expression. If there were indeed “other avenues” for 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights, then reviewing courts should be more 
deferential to prison officials. Id. (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 827). 
ANNA.DOC 7/1/2007 10:58 PM 
1240 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
                                                          
expression was limited in order to advance valid interests, it was 
necessary to determine what other options remained open, 
suggesting the importance of deference while recognizing the 
need to protect prisoners from total deprivation.95
Third, the Court found it necessary to analyze the difficulties 
a prison would face were it forced to provide the freedom 
requested by the inmate.96 Potential effects on prison 
administration, officials, the implication for other inmates, and 
the stated goals of the regulation were all considered.97
Finally, the fourth Turner factor focused on whether there 
were less restrictive alternatives that would accomplish the same 
objectives.98 If equally effective alternatives exist, there is a 
presumption that the chosen restriction constitutes an unlawful 
“exaggerated response.”99 The Court noted, however, that the 
burden of showing a less restrictive alternative falls on the 
prisoner rather than officials.100 Furthermore, the Court 
cautioned that the fourth factor should not be viewed as a “least 
restrictive alternative test.”101 Rather, if an inmate were to 
present a workable alternative that satisfied the goal while also 
accommodating First Amendment rights “at de minimis cost,” it 
could indicate that the regulation was not truly reasonable.102
Applying the newly articulated four-part test to the facts of 
Turner, the Court first addressed the limitation on 
correspondence with inmates at other prisons.103 Searching for a 




98 Id. at 90-91. 
99 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 87, 90 (1987). 
100 Id. at 91. 
101 Id. at 90-91. It appears the Court was concerned that a test requiring 
the least restrictive alternative would place too much of a procedural burden 
on prison administrators, and so emphasized that review of regulations should 
not require an administrator to “set up and then shoot down every 
conceivable alternative method of accomoda[tion].” Id. 
102 Id. at 90-91. 
103 Id. at 91. 
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penological interest, the Court cited prison officials’ testimony 
that mail between prisoners could be used to arrange attacks, 
escapes, gang affiliations, and the like.104 The Court observed 
that the restriction was logically connected to legitimate security 
concerns in general prison administration and not content 
based.105
Addressing the second and third factors, the Court briefly 
noted that the limitation on inmate-to-inmate correspondence did 
not necessarily limit freedom of expression, as prisoners were 
still able to exercise their First Amendment rights through 
correspondence with non-inmates.106 Furthermore, the Court 
recognized that if the letter writing were allowed, the negative 
impact on prison administration would be too burdensome. 
Citing the “potential [of a] ‘ripple effect’” from one prison to 
another,107 the Court concluded that it was much more 
hazardous to allow the letter writing than to limit it. 
Finally, the Court noted that the prisoners challenging the 
regulation had failed to point to any “obvious, easy 
104 Id. Confirming the logic behind the prohibition on letter writing, the 
Court pointed to similar restrictions that kept inmates or former inmates from 
communicating with one another, such as after one is released on parole. Id. 
at 92. Additionally, the Court noted a Missouri prison policy of keeping 
inmates separate so as to reduce gang association amongst inmates. Id. at 92. 
These goals could only be furthered by the restriction on inmate-to-inmate 
correspondence. Along these lines, the Court also emphasized that the 
regulation only prohibits such conduct between prisoners at other Missouri 
correctional institutions. Id. 
105 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1987). 
106 Id. One could also assume that communication could occur during 
contact visits or phone calls. Notably, the Court did not spend sufficient time 
worrying about alternatives for prisoners to express themselves, and turned to 
address the impact of allowing the right on the prison. Id. at 91-92. 
107 Id. Here, the Court focused on the impact of allowing letter writing 
between prisoners, forcing prison officials to read every letter and to excise 
any dangerous content. Id. Noting that this would impose significant costs on 
the prison system and would present the risk that staff would not be able to 
catch certain coded messages, the Court affirmed that the alternative was 
insufficient at reaching the penological goal. Id. 
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alternatives.”108 Although the plaintiffs had suggested that 
inmate-to-inmate communications be monitored or read by 
prison administrators instead, the Court quickly dismissed that 
idea as “impos[ing] more than a de minimis cost on the pursuit 
of legitimate corrections goals.”109 Furthermore, the Court noted 
the skepticism of prison officials in making such an alternative 
work, as it would be more difficult to read and monitor 
prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence, citing the possibility that 
dangerous messages could escape detection through gang-related 
codes.110 The Court concluded that the limitations on prisoner 
correspondence were fully justified and did not violate prisoners’ 
First Amendment rights.111
If the limitation on inmate correspondence were the only 
regulation called into question in Turner, it is likely that the 
Court’s overall analysis would have been exceedingly 
deferential. Indeed, much of the Court’s decision was based on 
prison officials’ testimony and the possibility of negative 
consequences if the right to correspond were allowed.112 
Accepting these conjectures at face value, the Court 
demonstrated its trust of officials in calculating and responding 
to probable harms. The Court’s deference, however, did not 
extend to the restriction on the right of inmates to marry. 
Addressing the ban on inmate marriage, the Court scrutinized 
the regulation’s paltry justifications, and concluded that such an 
overbearing restriction was an unconstitutional limitation on the 
fundamental right to marry.113
Examining the reasoning behind the marriage restriction, the 
Court ridiculed the security concerns expressed by prison 
officials, including the claims that “love triangles might lead to 
violent confrontations between inmates,” and that female 
prisoners needed to be kept away from certain types of men and 
108 Id. at 93. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987). 
112 Id. at 106 n.5 
113 Id. at 97-100. 
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encouraged to seek healthier relationships.114 The Court found 
that the regulation was over-reaching, pointing to viable 
alternatives that would allow inmates to marry while still 
ensuring prison security.115 The claim that female prisoners’ 
rehabilitation would be aided by a restriction on marriage was 
dismissed outright.116 There was no legitimate penological 
interest, nor was the restriction at all rationally related to the 
proffered goal.117 The regulation could not pass muster under 
the first prong of the Turner test and so the ban on inmate 
marriage was struck down without further review.118
The Court’s decision in Turner was not unanimous. In 
dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the new framework espoused 
by the majority was useless: “if the standard [could] be satisfied 
by nothing more than a ‘logical connection’ between the 
regulation and any legitimate penological concern perceived by a 
cautious warden, it is virtually meaningless.”119 Emphasizing its 
absurdity, Justice Stevens claimed that the test would permit a 
warden’s mere imagination to establish legitimate security 
concerns.120 Arguably, the test would allow far reaching 
anticipatory restrictions because Turner did not require evidence 
or even a suggestion of need.121
114 Id. 
115 Id. The Court noted 28 C.F.R. § 551.10 (1986), a federal prison 
regulation that permitted inmate marriage unless a warden had cause to 
believe the marriage would otherwise threaten the security of the prison or 
the general public safety. Turner, 482 U.S. at 98. 
116 Id. at 98-100. 
117 While recognizing the need to regulate the particulars of marriage 
ceremonies in prison, the Court noted that “the almost complete ban on the 
decision to marry is not reasonably related to legitimate penological 
objectives.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 87, 99 (1987). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 100 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
120 Id. at 100-01. 
121 Id. 
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II.  TURNER APPLIED 
Part I of this Comment traced the evolution of standards for 
First Amendment challenges to prison regulations. Part II 
reviews a sampling of specific First Amendment prisoner cases 
concerning restrictions that limit prisoners’ access to books, 
magazines, and other reading materials. At first glance, the 
Turner test appears fair, favoring deference to prison officials, 
while still weighing the importance of prisoners’ rights. In fact, 
the four-factor analysis was undertaken with ease by various 
lower courts. The following discussion concerns several 
instances in which restrictions on prisoners’ First Amendment 
rights were upheld under the Turner framework. 
A.  Thornburgh v. Abbott122
Abbott involved a challenge to prison restrictions on 
incoming publications for inmates.123 Pursuant to Federal 
Bureau of Prison regulation 28 C.F.R. § 540.71, wardens were 
authorized to reject incoming publications if they were deemed 
to be “detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of 
the institution or if [they] might facilitate criminal activity.”124
Though the right to receive publications was not entirely 
restricted, it was severely limited in certain situations.125 
Distinguishing the new test, the Court stressed that, unlike 
122 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 403 n.1. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 540.71 (2007), wardens may 
reject books, single issues of magazines or newspapers, or other print 
materials based on the objective of enforcing security and order, and 
suppressing criminal activity. To ensure the wardens follow protocol, § 
540.71 provides a “non-exhaustive list of criteria” to base rejection on. 
Abbott, 490 U.S. at 405. Furthermore, if the published material is part of a 
subscription, the warden must review each issue independently. 28 C.F.R. § 
540.71(c) (2007). Finally, the regulation requires the warden to provide 
procedural safeguards so that the First Amendment rights of prisoners and 
senders are not violated. 28 C.F.R. § 540.71 (2007). 
125 Abbott, 490 U.S. at 404. 
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Procunier, the framework in Turner did not require a “least 
restrictive means” test.126 Recognizing that Turner involved 
deference to prison officials, the Court extended its application 
to “regulations affecting the sending of a ‘publication’ to a 
prisoner.”127
Applying the Turner factors, the Court emphasized that 
prison officials were particularly well-situated to determine 
which publications might create upset amongst inmates.128 
Following, the Court noted that it was “comforted by the 
individualized nature of the determinations . . . [as] under the 
regulations, no publication may be excluded unless the warden 
himself makes the determination.”129 Accordingly, the Court 
found the restrictions legitimately connected to the goal of prison 
security, neutral in content, and rationally related to the 
proffered objective of maintaining safety and order.130 
Moreover, the Court found that alternative avenues for prisoner 
expression remained open as inmates were still allowed access to 
unobjectionable publications.131 The restriction was “limited to 
those [publications] found potentially detrimental to order and 
security,” and was necessary to avoid a “‘ripple effect’” 
amongst other inmates and prison officials.132 Finally, no easy 
alternatives had been presented or discussed by the inmates 
challenging the restriction.133 Upholding the restrictions, the 
Supreme Court reinforced its ruling in Turner and extended its 
rationale to the area of prisoners’ access to certain publications. 
Unlike the majority opinion, Justice Stevens remained 
focused on the flaws inherent in the structure of the Turner 
standard134 and reiterated his contention that the standard was 
126 Id. at 411. 
127 Id. at 413 (internal citations omitted). 
128 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989). 
129 Id. at 416. 
130 Id. at 414-15. 
131 Id. at 417-18. 
132 Id. at 418. 
133 Id. 
134 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 420-34 (1989). 
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virtually meaningless as it barely questioned the reasoning 
behind the publication restrictions.135 Stressing dissatisfaction 
with the final prong of the test, the inquiry into alternatives, 
Stevens pointed to clear alternatives,136 like clipping the 
offensive materials out of publications before giving them to 
prisoners.137 Citing to a portion of the record in which an expert 
witness in the field of corrections admitted that there was no real 
security risk with such an alternative,138 Stevens rejected the 
consideration of administrative convenience.139
B.  Thompson v. Campbell140
Similarly, Thompson v. Campbell also involved restrictions 
on prisoners’ incoming reading materials.141 Three restrictions 
were in question: first, prisoners could not receive mail that 
advocated anarchy or contained “obscene or sexual content;”142 
second, they could only receive books, magazines, or 
135 Id. at 434. 
136 Id. at 432-33. 
137 Id. at 431. 
138 Id. Specifically, Stevens urged that “a review of the record reveals 
that the Court thus defers to ‘findings’ of a security threat that even prison 
officials admitted to be nonexistent.” Id. at 432. In his footnote 17, Stevens 
provided actual questions and answers from trial testimony involving an 
expert in the field of corrections. The expert stated that he personally felt that 
cutting out the offensive portions of material “smacks of what goes on in 
fascist countries and is not a very attractive solution to me,” but provided no 
argument that anyone other than administration would feel so uncomfortable 
with the situation. Id. at 433 n.17. Rather, the expert conceded that it “would 
not prevent a security threat to cut out the page if there was nothing else in 
[the material that was restricted].” Id. The expert then emphasized that the 
real benefit behind total censorship of questionable material was to ease 
administrative burdens, as no prisoners could criticize or challenge the 
process of what would be cut out versus what would be allowed. Id. 
139 Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 434. 
140 Thompson v. Campbell, 81 FED App. 563 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, Thompson v. White, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3102 (U.S., Apr. 26, 2004). 
141 Thompson, 81 FED App. At 564-65.  
142 Id. 
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newspapers sent directly from publishers;143 and third, they 
were prohibited from receiving bulk rate mail.144 While serving 
his life sentence in a Tennessee correctional complex, Harold 
Thompson was denied access to his incoming reading materials 
at least two dozen times, mostly due to “anarchist content.”145 
Prison officials asserted that the regulations were necessary to 
maintain order and security.146
Applying the Turner framework, the Sixth Circuit addressed 
the first regulation, against reading materials involving anarchy 
or sexual content.147 Noting the goal of prison security, the 
court affirmed that the regulation was neutral and necessary to 
maintain safety and promote rehabilitation.148 Even without 
proof that possession of the materials caused problems amongst 
inmates or in the prison, the court plainly stated that its only 
concern was “whether a reasonable official might think that the 
policy advances these interests [of security].”149 It seemed quite 
clear to the court that deference was appropriate, as allowing 
materials that promoted anarchy and deviant sexual behavior in 
143 Id. at 565. 
144 Id. Bulk-rate mail is also known as standard-rate mail, and refers to a 
type of mail sent with a lower postage cost. Generally, when a large number 
of essentially identical items must be sent out for business purposes, they will 
be sent as bulk-rate mail. Items such as newsletters, bulletins, catalogues, 
fliers, circulars and advertisements are all sent bulk-rate. United States Postal 
Service, Business Mail 101, http://www.usps.com/businessmail101/classes/ 
standard.htm (last visited April 20, 2007); http://www.usps.com 
/businessmail101/getstarted/bulkMail.htm (last visited April 20, 2007). 
145 Thompson, 81 FED App. at 564-65. 
146 Thompson v. Campbell, 81 FED App. 563, 565-67 (6th Cir. 2003). 
147 Id. at 567-68. 
148 Id. at 567. The regulation explicitly banned materials that would 
“pose a threat to institutional security,” and that could “reasonably be 
considered to advocate, facilitate, or otherwise present a risk of lawlessness, 
anarchy or rebellion against government authority.” Id. at 564-65 (internal 
citations omitted). This included not only anarchy-based materials, but also 
sexually themed photographs, pictures, drawings, or reading materials that 
would in some way encourage criminal sexual deviance amongst prisoners. 
Id. at 565. 
149 Id. at 567. 
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prison was antithetical to maintaining order.150
Under the second Turner factor, the court confirmed there 
were certainly alternative means for prisoners to exercise their 
First Amendment rights, as prisoners were still able to access 
various publications.151 Considering the third factor and the 
possible impact on the prison if the prohibited materials were 
allowed, the court noted the likelihood of a broad ripple 
effect.152 Although there was no proof that Thompson himself 
would rise up against prison officials or engage in deviant sexual 
acts if permitted the materials, the court emphasized that it could 
not ignore the possibility that other prisoners might also gain 
access to the questionable materials.153 Ultimately, the court 
concluded that Thompson had failed to suggest any workable 
alternatives, and that the regulation, therefore, did “not 
represent an ‘exaggerated response to the problem at hand.’”154
The court affirmed the constitutionality of the restrictions as 
the policy of prohibiting certain materials was logically 
connected to maintaining order, alternative means of reading 
remained open, and there were no other ways to advance the 
same goals. Regarding the other two regulations in question, the 
publisher-only rule and ban on bulk rate mail, the court simply 
invoked precedent under Bell v. Wolfish and Sheets v. Moore,155 
upholding both of these restrictions as well.156
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Thompson v. Campbell, 81 FED App. 563, 567 (6th Cir. 2003). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. Although Thompson did suggest that prison officials only allow 
him the specific reading material, and that he would promise not to distribute 
it to other prisoners, the court noted that such an alternative would either 
require prison administrators to believe Thompson’s word, or “devote 
considerable resources to verifying that he is keeping his word.” Id. at 568. 
155 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520 (1979) and Sheets v. Moore, 97 
F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 1996). 
156 As Bell addressed the permissibility of a publishers-only rule, and as 
Sheets found a ban on bulk rate mail constitutional, the court found no need 
to apply Turner to these restrictions. 
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C.  Willson v. Buss157
In Willson, an inmate was denied access to certain special 
interest magazines to which he had subscribed, including The 
Advocate and Out, both categorized as homosexual lifestyle and 
interest magazines.158 However, neither publication contained 
“sexually graphic material,” only articles that would be of 
special interest to homosexuals.159 Pursuant to prison 
procedures, any incoming publication that was deemed obscene, 
“blatant[ly] homosexual,” or that “jeopardize[d] the safety, 
security, or orderly operation of [the] facility” could be 
restricted.160
Applying Turner, the district court found that the purpose of 
the restriction was to “keep out of the prison anything that 
would lead a prisoner to believe another prisoner was 
homosexual.”161 Prison administrators feared that an inmate in 
possession of such material would be “targeted for sexual 
gratification, other physical abuse, and extortion.”162 While 
acknowledging that attitudes toward homosexuality had changed 
with time, and that homosexuality received protection under 
privacy rights through Lawrence v. Texas,163 the court made it 
157 Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ind. 2005). 
158 Id. at 784. 
159 Id. Out and The Advocate were characterized by Willson as the 
“homosexual version of People and Newsweek, respectively.” Id. Out 
advertises itself as “a gay and lesbian perspective on style, entertainment, 
fashion, the arts, politics, culture, and the world at large.” Out Magazine, 
http://www.out.com (last accessed April 20, 2007). Conversely, The 
Advocate boasts its “award-winning [lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender] 
news site.” The Advocate, http://www.advocate.com/index.asp (last accessed 
Dec. 4, 2006). Willson did not complain about his inability to read specific 
articles, but about the general denial of these magazines that cater to 
homosexual interests in entertainment, politics, culture, and world events. 
160 Willson, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (referring to Westville Correctional 
Facility General Rules and Procedures, 2002 § XII(D)). 
161 Id. at 785. 
162 Id. 
163 Indeed, the Court noted that the shame and illegality of homosexual 
behavior emphasized in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) “was put 
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clear that the issue at hand was not the prisoner’s right to be 
homosexual or to engage in homosexual acts, but rather to 
protect the safety and welfare of the inmate in possession of the 
materials.164
Under the first prong of Turner, the court deferred to prison 
officials, finding the interest in protecting inmates legitimate and 
the regulation rational.165 Citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, the court 
noted that it was not “necessary to show that materials are 
‘likely’ to lead to violence, but rather, it is sufficient to show 
that in the absence of the regulation a potential danger would 
exist.”166 Arguably, there was no way to stop the magazines 
from circulating once inside the prison, and so it was possible 
that anyone in possession of the homosexual magazines could be 
targeted for additional violence or extortion, thereby increasing 
the potential danger.167 Finally, the court found that, although 
to rest” in Lawrence, but that the present case had less to do with the 
illegality of homosexuality as an act, and more to do with prisoners safety. 
Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 2d 784, 785 (N.D. Ind. 2005). In Lawrence, 
the Supreme Court extended the right of privacy to consensual homosexual 
acts, noting that: 
[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of 
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity 
as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in 
a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the 
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this 
choice.  
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). The Court then 
contrasted the magazine regulation, demonstrating that the concern was 
not that inmates would find consensual romantic partners in prison, but 
rather that inmates would be targeted, blackmailed, raped, or the like if 
their fellow inmates knew of their sexual orientation. Willson, 370 F. 
Supp. 2d at 785-86. 
164 Willson, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 786. 
165 Id. at 787-90. 
166 Id. at 788 (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417 (1989). 
167 Id. at 788-89. Noting that the Ninth Circuit explicitly found that 
being identified as a homosexual in prison threatened prison safety because it 
could lead to violence against those with homosexual reading material. 
Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1989). In Harper, the 
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the regulation was focused on restricting homosexual materials, 
it was content neutral.168
Addressing the second Turner factor, the court dismissed the 
importance of alternative means for the inmates to access 
homosexual-related reading materials in light of the importance 
of the security rationale.169 Similarly, the court did not spend 
much effort on the third factor, finding the same safety concerns 
and difficulties would result if the prison were forced to 
accommodate the prisoners’ desire for such material.170
Finally, under the fourth Turner factor, the court reviewed 
the inmate’s suggested alternative that the magazines be 
prohibited from common areas, but allowed in private cells, 
thereby decreasing the possibility that the magazines would be 
passed around and lead to violence against those in 
possession.171 The suggestion was, however, quickly dismissed 
as “sexual items, including those promoting homosexual 
activity” were already prohibited from use or display in common 
areas.172 Noting that the proposed alternative would do nothing 
to prevent the labeling of those in possession of the magazines, 
the court found the threat of violence remained and accordingly 
affirmed the constitutionality of the regulation.173
As demonstrated through Abbott, Thompson and Willson, 
courts at all levels have found that the Turner test provides a 
workable balance between prisoners’ First Amendment rights 
and the needs of prison administrators. These cases demonstrate 
a clear penological interest in prohibiting prisoners from having 
prisoners challenged a ban on mail from the North American Man Boy Love 
Association (NAMBLA). Id. The Ninth Circuit emphasized safety concerns 
were well founded as “inmates who are identified as or suspected of being 
pedophiles or homosexuals are a favorite target for violence since many 
incarcerated felons were sexually abuses as children.” Willson, 370 F. Supp. 
2d at 781 (citing Harper, 877 F.2d at 730, 733). 
168 Willson, 370 F. Supp. at 789. 
169 Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 782, 790 (N.D. Ind. 2005). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 790-92. 
173 Id. at 791. 
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deviant or disruptive materials, recognizing the possible harm 
that would result if prisoners were allowed access. Be it the 
possibility of violent outbreaks as in Abbott, chaos or sexual 
deviance as in Thompson, or inciting harassment and violence as 
in Willson, the regulations were justified by the need of prison 
officials to protect inmates and to avoid future harm. 
III.  DECONSTRUCTING BEARD V. BANKS 
The first and second parts of this Comment illustrated the 
formulation of the standard of review in cases concerning 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights. Part III examines the 
background of Banks and addresses the reasoning behind the 
Supreme Court’s decision to apply Turner so deferentially. 
Section A focuses specifically on the Court’s analysis of the 
regulation, and highlights the deferential and detached review 
under the four-factor test. Section B then examines the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Banks. 
In Banks, the Court found a rational relationship between the 
goal of prisoner safety and rehabilitation, and the resulting 
restrictions on reading materials and personal photographs.174 In 
its application of Turner, however, the Court arguably failed to 
truly scrutinize the restrictions under the third and fourth 
prongs,175 resulting in something more akin to automatic 
deference than judicial review. Though the Turner factors 
appeared to be clear, concise and fair, as Abbott, Thompson, and 
Willson demonstrate, the Supreme Court’s decision in Beard v. 
Banks suggests that either Turner’s usefulness has been 
exhausted, or that any regulation could pass the test if its basis 
is rational. By misapplying Turner and failing to establish the 
validity of the justifications behind the regulation, the Supreme 
Court opened the door for confusion as to how future courts 
should apply, or even consider, Turner. 
174 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2574 (2006). 
175 Id. at 2580 
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A.  The Total Misapplication of Turner 
Like Abbott, Thompson and Willson, the recent case of 
Beard v. Banks involved restrictions on prisoner access to 
certain publications.176 Yet, unlike previous cases, the 
regulations in Banks were not justified by safety or necessity, 
but instead by the need to rehabilitate prisoners.177
Banks involved a Pennsylvania state prison restriction that 
prohibited inmate access to newspapers, magazines, and personal 
photographs.178 The ban only affected inmates housed in the 
most restrictive level of the prison, Long Term Segregation Unit 
(“LTSU”), Level 2. This unit held the most contentious 
prisoners—individuals categorized by one or more of the 
following: “assaultive behavior;” “causing injury to other 
inmates or staff;” engaging in disturbing behavior; possessing 
weapons; a history of escape attempts; or “being a sexual 
predator.”179 Upon entering the prison, all inmates were initially 
assigned to Level 2.180 Thus, the restriction applied to all 
inmates at one time or another, regardless of behavioral 
problems. Inmates remained in Level 2, subject to the 
restrictions unless, after 90 days, prison administrators believed 
the inmate worthy of a less restrictive level.181 As noted by the 
Court, however, in practice, most inmates never graduated to a 
different level.182 Despite the restrictions, all inmates were 
allowed “legal and personal correspondence, religious and legal 
materials, two library books, and writing paper.”183
176 Id. at 2572. 
177 Id. at 2578. 
178 Id. at 2576. 
179 Id. Some of the other factors include “failure to complete the SMU 
[Special Management Unit] program. . . engaging in facility disturbances; 
belonging to an unauthorized organization or Security Threat Group; 
engaging in criminal activity that threatened the community. . . exerting 
negative influence in facility activities.” Id. 
180 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2576 (2006). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 2577. 
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The challenge to the regulation was brought by Ronald 
Banks, a prisoner in LTSU Level 2, against the Secretary of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Jeffrey Banks.184 
Justifying the restrictions, the Secretary claimed (1) the “need to 
motivate better behavior on the part of particularly difficult 
prisoners,” (2) the need to minimize the amount of material in 
prisoner cells, and (3) prison safety.185 Upon review, however, 
the Supreme Court only addressed the first justification, finding 
it to be a “legitimate penological objective” and rationally 
connected to the restrictions, thereby satisfying the first Turner 
factor.186 As prisoners were left with so little personal property 
or freedom in Level 2, the Court reasoned that the regulation 
was effective in depriving the inmates of “virtually the last 
privilege left,” providing an incentive for better behavior.187
Addressing the second Turner factor, the alternative means 
for the prisoner to exercise the restricted right, the Court found 
simply that there were none.188 Citing prison statistics,189 the 
Court noted that while, after 90 days, prisoners could be moved 
and granted limited access to newspapers and magazines,190 only 
approximately one out of four inmates ever actually graduated to 
a less restrictive level.191 Though previous applications of 
Turner suggested that the absence of any alternative would 
“provide evidence that the regulations [were] unreasonable,”192 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 2578. 
186 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2579 (2006). 
187 Id. at 2579. 
188 Id. at 2579-80. 
189 To illustrate the restrictions on prisoners, the Court noted that the 
LTSU is one of three special units in the Pennsylvania prison system meant 
for the most difficult prisoners, “the commonwealth’s most incorrigible, 
recalcitrant inmates.” Id. at 2576. These special units restrict the majority of 
prisoner activity. There are approximately forty inmates within the LTSU, 
and all inmates are initially placed in Level 2 of the LTSU. Id. 
190 In Level 1, prisoners are allowed one newspaper and five magazines, 
but still no personal photographs. Id. at 2577. 
191  Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2579. 
192 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2580 (2006) (citing Overton v. 
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the Court in Banks emphasized that the lack of any alternative 
means of access to newspapers, magazines, and personal 
photographs was not determinative and that the restrictions 
were, nonetheless, reasonable.193
There was no further discussion of the second Turner factor. 
Although Turner emphasized that alternatives should be 
considered, the Banks court gave no rational or insight into its 
judgment.194 While in theory the second Turner factor balances 
deference to prison officials with the need to protect prisoners 
from total deprivation, in Banks, application of the second factor 
was brief, overly deferential, and without real consideration of 
other alternatives.195
Evaluating the potential impact on the administration and 
other prisoners under the third Turner prong, the Court again 
provided simple, deferential review.196 Curtailing access to 
newspapers, magazines, and photographs provided incentive for 
prisoners to adhere to prison policy.197 Notably absent is any 
discussion of the possible “ripple effect” that removing the 
restriction would cause. This stands in contrast to the Court’s 
analysis of the restrictions at issue in Willson, Thompson and 
Abbott.198 In those cases, lifting the restrictions would have 
affected the prison community as a whole. In Banks, however, 
the only impact would be a reduction of incentives to behave 
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003)). 
193 Id. at 2580. 
194 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 87, 90 (1987). 
195 Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2579-80. Truly, discussion of the second factor 
was limited to one paragraph, simply noting that while there were no 
alternatives, it did not conclusively mean the regulation was not rational or 
reasonably related to the goal of the prison administration. 
196 Id. at 2580. 
197 Id. 
198 In Willson, Thompson, and Abbott, the Court scrutinized the impact 
of allowing the right, whether it was the personal safety of other inmates, 
safety of the prison environment, or the possibility of violence and 
harassment. Because allowing the restricted reading material in Willson, 
Thompson, and Abbott would clearly create or exacerbate problems in prison 
administration and general safety, the impact of allowing the restricted 
reading material was simply too great to allow. 
ANNA.DOC 7/1/2007 10:58 PM 
1256 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
                                                          
better.199
Addressing the final Turner factor, the Court again noted 
that because the restriction was based on policy ideals, there 
were simply no viable alternatives or less restrictive ways to 
accomplish the goals.200 Recognizing that its application of the 
second, third, and fourth factors was circularly deferential, 
based on the rehabilitation goals of the Secretary, the Court 
justified its behavior by noting that these factors did little to add 
to “the first factor’s basic logical rationale.”201 Rather, it 
suggested that balancing the factors took a back seat to 
determining “whether the Secretary [had shown] more than 
simply a logical relation, that is, whether he [had shown] a 
reasonable relation.”202 This, perhaps, was the Court’s way of 
saying that the Turner test, in fact, was not satisfied, or that the 
four-factor test was simply inapplicable in a situation in which 
the goal was rehabilitation—a goal that does not necessarily 
allow for alternative avenues of expression. 
Citing Overton v. Bazzetta,203 the Court opined that there 
was truly no other way to “induce compliance with the rules of 
inmate behavior, especially for high-security prisoners who have 
few other privileges to lose.”204 The Banks Court found that the 
199 Ironically, the reward incentive of depriving prisoners of access to 
these materials did not even appear effective in the first place. According to 
prison statistics already referenced by the Court, only approximately one in 
four inmates were ever rehabilitated enough to leave Level 2 and graduate 
into better circumstances. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2590 (2006). 
Furthermore, all inmates were initially placed into Level 2, so there was no 
way to keep track of if and how this specific regulation on its own was 
impacting inmate behavior. Id. It perhaps belabors the point to emphasize that 
if the worst of the worst are being contained in Level 2, there is little chance 
that merely depriving them from personal photographs or newspapers would 
encourage a total turnaround in behavior. 
200  Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2580. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. (emphasis in original). 
203 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003). 
204 Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2580 (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 134). In 
Overton, the Court upheld visitation restrictions on prisoners who violated 
prison substance abuse guidelines. The restrictions required that all visitors be 
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restrictions as issue, like those in Overton, were aimed at a 
discrete set of individuals, and had resulted from the 
professional judgment of prison administrators.205
Furthermore, the Supreme Court dismissed outright the 
Third Circuit’s analysis and ultimate rejection of the restriction, 
noting that the lower court placed too much of an evidentiary 
burden on the Secretary.206 While the court below was 
concerned with whether the restrictions would actually be 
effective in modifying behavior and “whether the deprivation 
pre-approved by the prison administration, included family and ten other 
visitors, but that no children under the age of eighteen could be on the list 
unless they were somehow related to the prisoner. Overton, 539 U.S. at 129 
(2003). However, if the prisoner was guilty of multiple prison violations, 
visitation privileges were restricted to attorneys and religious leaders. Id. at 
130. 
205 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2580 (2006). 
206 Id. at 2581. The Third Circuit expressed hesitation regarding the 
rehabilitation justification. While agreeing that “deterrence of future 
infractions of prison rules can be an appropriate justification for temporarily 
restricting the rights of inmates,” the court was not satisfied that the 
regulations actually served the purpose. Beard v. Banks, 399 F.3d 134, 140-
41 (3rd Cir. 2005). If the restrictions were placed on prisoners for limited 
amounts of time, whenever prisoners were shown to violate rules or 
regulations, then surely the restrictions could pass as a way to encourage 
better behavior. Id. at 141. However, the court noted that because the 
prohibition would likely not have a great impact on inmate behavior, in light 
of all the other restrictions imposed on prisoners, “the relationship between 
the policy and the penological interest may be too attenuated to be 
reasonable.” Id. at 144. Emphasizing that the prisoners were not requesting 
“unlimited access to innumerable periodicals,” the court was at a loss in 
distinguishing how writing paper and religious texts could be differentiated 
and assumed to be any less of a security threat. Id. 
  In his dissent, Judge Alito recognized that the uncertainty surrounding 
how, when or why an inmate may be transferred out of Level 2 could impact 
“the degree of the incentive,” it did not follow that “the incentive is wholly 
destroyed.” Id. at 149 (Alito, J., dissenting). Additionally, Alito argued that 
the Turner test had never required evidentiary proof of the effectiveness of 
regulations, finding that “the entire system of prison discipline might be 
imperilled [sic] if each sanction for prison misconduct could not be sustained 
without empirical evidence that the sanction provided some incremental 
deterrent.” Id. 
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theory of behavior modification had any basis in real human 
psychology, or had proven effective with LTSU inmates,”207 the 
Supreme Court emphasized the need for deference.208 
Accordingly, the Court upheld the regulations.209
B.  Deprive and then Make Better: Concurring and 
Dissenting Justices Emphasize the Faulty 
Rehabilitative Reasoning of Banks 
The Court’s decision in Banks was not unanimous.210 Both 
concurring and dissenting justices chastised the majority’s quick 
approval of the rehabilitative goals of the Pennsylvania system, 
and fast and loose application of Turner. 
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas pointed out that perhaps 
the reason the majority had such a difficult time applying the 
Turner factors was due to the fact that the Turner framework 
was not developed with regulations “that seek to modify inmate 
behavior through privilege deprivation” in mind.211 Rather, 
Justice Thomas stressed the fact that in application, such 
rehabilitative regulations will, without a doubt, pass muster 
under the first factor of reasonableness, but will necessarily fail 
under the second. “Such policies, by design, do not provide an 
‘alternative means’ for inmates to exercise the rights they have 
been deprived.”212 As to the third and fourth factors, Justice 
Thomas noted that there was truly no reason to evaluate whether 
the regulation was impinging on prisoner rights if the goal of 
rehabilitation was being fulfilled.213
Delving further into the majority’s flawed reasoning, in his 
dissent Justice Stevens addressed the fact that while the 
207 Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134, 140-141 (3d Cir. 2005). 
208 Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2581. 
209 Id. at 2582. 
210 Id. at 2582-93 (2006). Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred in the 
judgment of the case, while Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented. Id. 
211 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2584 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 2585. 
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Secretary presented several penological reasons for the 
restrictions, the majority only addressed one—that of 
rehabilitation.214 Concentrating on the other proffered 
justifications for the regulation, Stevens pointed to the 
Secretary’s contention that the regulation was necessary in order 
to limit the amount of materials an inmate could have in his 
cell.215 Referencing the record below, Stevens noted that each 
inmate was allowed a variety of materials in his cell, including 
bedding, toilet paper, writing paper, envelopes, socks, 
underwear, religious newspapers, Bibles, a lunch tray, plate and 
cup.216 Any of these items, Stevens argued, could easily be used 
to start fires, throw feces, and create other dangerous situations, 
all of which prison administrators noted were of concern in 
enacting the regulation.217 As such, he posited, this aspect of the 
Secretary’s justification for the restriction could not be deemed 
logical, as the restricted newspapers, magazines and personal 
photographs would not likely exacerbate the cluttered 
environment of the prison cells.218
Justice Stevens also noted that the method and nature of the 
majority’s review provided no limit on prison regulations or 
general deprivation where rehabilitation was concerned.219 He 
argued that such a justification had no stopping point: “if 
sufficient, it would provide a ‘rational basis’ for any regulation 
that deprives a prisoner of a constitutional right so long as there 
is at least a theoretical possibility that the prisoner can regain the 
214 Id. at 2586 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
215 Id. at 2586-87. 
216 Id. at 2586. 
217 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2586 (2006). 
218 Emphasizing the tenuous logical connection, Stevens referred to a 
prison official’s deposition that conceded inmates could always use what they 
were allowed in their cells to misbehave in the way prison officials feared. 
Id. at 2587. Specifically, in Superintendent Dickson’s deposition, he admitted 
that inmates could easily start fires with the allowed writing paper and 
bedding, and could easily throw feces and urine with the cup inmates were 
provided with in their cells. Id. 
219 Id. at 2588. 
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right at some future time by modifying his behavior.”220 
Furthermore, Justice Stevens called attention to the fact that if 
the Court could always view deprivation for rehabilitation as 
rational, the Turner test would effectively be obviated.221
To ensure that rehabilitation would not be used to justify all 
limitations on prisoners’ rights, Justice Stevens underscored the 
need for more review and less deference to prison officials.222 
Even if there were a bare “logical connection to 
rehabilitation . . . prison officials are not entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.”223 Furthermore, in light of the other 
restrictions placed on inmates in the LTSU Level 2, Stevens 
emphasized that there already were great incentives for prisoners 
to behave better with the hope of graduating into a less 
restrictive level.224 Moreover, because prisoners were never 
given access to personal photographs, even if they did graduate 
to Level 1, there was a clear indication that the regulation was 
in fact an exaggerated response to prisoner behavior.225 Plainly, 
the deprivation was not linked to any need for rehabilitation, as 
there were already restrictions accomplishing the objective.226
In a separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg also emphasized the 
220 Id. 
221 Id. In making his point, Justice Stevens invoked the marriage 
regulation challenged in Turner. If the denial of marriage could also have 
been justified on a rehabilitation basis, Stevens emphasized that the Court 
would have likely let the regulation stand, even though, under Turner, the 
very same court focused on the illogical justification behind the regulation. 
Id. 
222 Id. at 2588-89. 
223 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2588-89 (2006). Indeed, one of the 
most disturbing aspects of Banks may be that the case was decided on 
Beard’s motion for summary judgment. See id. at 2576. 
224 Id. at 2589. In addition to the restrictions on newspapers, magazines 
and personal photographs, inmates in Level 2 were also not allowed to watch 
television or listen to the radio, cannot use the commissary, cannot earn the 
GED or “special education study,” will not receive compensation for work 
done in the unit as a janitor, and are confined to solitary confinement 23 
hours a day. Id. at 2589. 
225 Id. at 2589-90. 
226 Id. 
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faulty rehabilitation theory.227 Criticizing the deference 
employed by the majority, she noted that the evidence and 
justifications provided by the Secretary would “justify virtually 
any prison regulation that [did] not involve physical abuse.”228 
Drawing on Turner, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that if the 
logical connection between the regulation and the goal was “so 
remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational,” then the 
regulation must be struck down.229 Arguably, it was irrational to 
deprive inmates of knowledge about current events like 
Hurricane Katrina or the Iraq war because they still had access 
to other publications, such as the “Jewish Daily Forward,” as it 
was a religious publication.230 Stressing the importance of 
evidentiary testimony in analyzing the reasonableness of the 
regulation, Ginsburg noted that much information was left to be 
desired.231
Indeed, Justices Thomas, Stevens and Ginsburg all 
recognized the inappropriateness of Turner’s application in 
Banks. At the very heart of Turner is an attempt to balance 
deference with protection, and because the prior applications of 
Turner involved maintaining prison safety as the ultimate goal, 
the question became: should Turner still be applied in situations 
in which the ultimate goal of prison administrators is a vague 
notion of rehabilitation? 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTION: RECALIBRATING THE DEFERENCE 
Parts I, II, and III of this Comment provided a substantial 
background in case law involving prisoners’ First Amendment 
rights, illustrating how courts analyze and balance the interests 
involved, and further examined the loose application of Turner 
227 Id. at 2591-93. 
228 Id. at 2592. 
229 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2593 (2006). 
230 Id. Referencing current events of the time, Justice Ginsburg was 
drawing on the fact that prisoners were prevented from reading newspapers 
or magazines and thereby prevented from following news stories that not only 
affected the country, but which had international significance as well. 
231 Id. 
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in Banks. Part IV suggests alternatives to the Court’s approach 
and use of Turner in situations in which rehabilitation is offered 
as an ultimate justification. 
There are many definitions of rehabilitation, including: “to 
restore to a former capacity,”232 “to restore or bring to a 
condition of health or useful and constructive activity,”233 and 
“preparation for release back into society.”234 While the 
American correctional system is primarily focused on deterring 
and punishing criminal behavior,235 prisons of course may still 
provide or require programs that encourage behavioral 
reform.236 Yet, if a rehabilitative program deprives prisoners’ of 
First Amendment rights, but does not even attempt to justify the 
deprivation as necessary to address a specific behavioral 
problem, there is cause for concern. 
In Banks, prison administrators never claimed that the 
inmates in Level 2 of LTSU had abused privileges for certain 
reading materials,237 or that their crimes were somehow 
232 Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.m-
w.com/dictionary/rehabilitation (last accessed April 20, 2007). 
233 Id. 
234 Brief for the ACLU et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 04-1739).
235 See generally, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of 
Prison (Editor Vintage Books 1995) (1979). 
236 As the Supreme Court noted in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002), 
rehabilitation is a valid objective of correctional facilities as “most offenders 
will eventually return to society.” Id. at 36. In McKune, the Court addressed 
the constitutionality of sexual abuse treatment programs and policies for 
prisoners who were convicted of sex-based crimes. Id. If the prisoners 
refused to participate in the rehabilitation program, they could be denied 
certain privileges including visitation rights, television, and working 
opportunities. Id. at 24. Recognizing that sexual offenders were more likely 
than any other offender to engage in similar crimes, the Court recognized that 
deprivation for the sake of rehabilitation may be justified if the deprivation 
relates to the prisoner’s specific conviction. Id. at 32-35. See also, King v. 
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 638-39 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing 
administration could rightfully deny prisoner access to a book if the book 
would encourage the same deviate behavior that prisoner was incarcerated 
for). 
237 See Brief of Petitioner at 4, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) 
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connected to the prohibited newspapers and magazines. Nor was 
any evidence provided to support the contention that deprivation 
of the items would actually motivate better behavior.238 
Prisoners were already placed in solitary confinement for 23 out 
of 24 hours a day, denied television and radio, and were 
prevented from earning their GED or taking special education 
classes.239 Upon close examination, the regulation at issue looks 
more like intensive punishment rather than a motivational 
tactic.240 Surely the measures already in place are incentive 
enough. Then again, only one out of every four inmates in Level 
2 improves his behavior enough to be moved into Level 1,241 
indicating that the theory behind depriving the prisoners rights in 
order to encourage better behavior is actually without any 
evidentiary support. Even the use of the word “rehabilitation” in 
this context smacks of irony. If a prisoner is kept in Level 2 for 
the term of his sentence, and denied access to news or current 
events, it is likely is that he will re-enter society at a distinct 
disadvantage.242 Surely total social isolation does not foster any 
(No. 04-1739). 
238 In fact, administrators only claimed that the prisoners were difficult 
to handle and that therefore further deprivation would provide general 
deterrence. Id. 
239 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2589 (2006). 
240 Brief for the ACLU et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 04-1739).
241 Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2576. 
242 Indeed, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), 
the Supreme Court emphasized the important role of newspapers and 
magazines in informing the public as to national affairs. Id. at 250. Because 
these forms of media provide the public with a universe of information about 
their government, newspapers and magazines are the ultimate tool for 
individuals to engage in political discourse and provide “restraints upon 
misgovernment.” Id. Furthermore, in Banks v. Beard, below, the Third 
Circuit noted a similar irony in the use of the deprivation as a means for 
rehabilitation, noting that “rehabilitative goals are ‘furthered by efforts to 
inform and educate inmates, and foster their involvement in the world outside 
the prison gates.’” 399 F.3d 134, 142 (citing Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 
F.2d 1015, 1034 (2d Cir. 1985)). The court also referenced the negative 
psychological impact that may result in prisoners who are deprived access to 
reading material. Banks, 399 F.3d at 142 (citing Spellman v. Hopper, 95 F. 
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legitimate rehabilitative goals. 
Because the rationale behind the restriction in Banks is vague 
and overbroad, the Court’s application of Turner provokes 
concern, suggesting any regulation could be justified as 
rehabilitative in nature. To ensure that this does not happen, and 
that prisoners retain their fundamental First Amendment rights, 
there must be less deference from the courts. Rather, Turner 
should be applied with an exacting eye, allowing for balance 
between the respect and trust owed to administrators who best 
know the system, and the importance of prisoners’ rights. 
Courts would do better to remember Turner’s predecessor, 
Procunier v. Martinez, and to scrutinize the justifications behind 
all-encompassing regulations, ensuring they do not go further 
than necessary. 
When the Turner test was applied in Banks, there was clear 
friction between the first part of the test and the other three.243 
Because the first factor inquires as to rationality, the connection 
between the regulation and a legitimate penological interest, the 
justification of rehabilitation passes without much scrutiny.244 As 
Supp. 2d 1267, 1281 (M.D. Ala. 1999)). 
243 Banks, 126 S.Ct. at 2579. This was indeed explicitly recognized by 
the majority: 
In fact, the second, third, and fourth factors, being in a sense 
logically related to the Policy itself, here add little, one way or 
another, to the first factor’s basic logical rationale . . . The fact that 
two of these latter three factors seem to support the Policy does 
not, therefore, count in the Secretary’s favor. The real task in this 
case is not balancing these factors, but rather determining whether 
the Secretary shows more than simply a logical relation, that is, 
whether he shows a reasonable relation. We believe the material 
presented here by the prison officials is sufficient to demonstrate 
that the Policy is a reasonable one.  
Id. (emphasis added).
244 As noted in Abbott, Thompson and Willson, infra, Part II, so long as 
prison administrators were able to justify a regulation as addressing security 
concerns, courts generally accepted the interest and application as plainly 
rational. Because rehabilitation is recognized as one of the objectives 
correctional facilities, it too serves a rational purpose. See McKune v. Lile, 
536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (finding rehabilitation serves a valid goal by 
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illustrated in Banks, however, because rehabilitation is such a 
weighty goal, the Supreme Court found it requires only a logical 
relation to the regulation,245 rendering the remaining three 
factors useless.246
If, however, the first factor were applied with less deference 
at the outset, the Turner test could still successfully be applied in 
cases such as Banks. The first Turner factor is intended to 
address the need for logic,247 and the Supreme Court should 
have truly examined the logic behind the regulation and 
scrutinized its tailoring. Under such critical analysis, it is likely 
that the ban on newspapers, magazines and personal photographs 
would have failed constitutional scrutiny, due to the lack of a 
reasonable relationship, and thus would not have passed the first 
prong of Turner. 
A restriction should not be looked at in isolation, but must 
be considered in light of the prison system and other regulations 
as a whole.248 While, at face value, the ban on certain reading 
materials may appear logical, (in the sense that deprivation could 
encourage better behavior), a general awareness of how Level 2 
functions illustrates how the regulation at hand is anything 
but.249 Moreover, while the possibility of rehabilitative 
programs was once heralded by the prison community, the 
general idea that harsh treatment of prisoners will deter and 
rehabilitate them has been questioned by recent studies.250
reshaping offenders before they return the general society). 
245 Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2579 (2006). 
246 Id. 
247 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 78, 81-82 (1987). 
248 See infra, Part IC, discussion of the second Turner factor. 
249 Coupled with the pre-existing regulations against telephone calls, 
television, radio, commissary, and solitary confinement, it is illogical to 
conclude that an additional restriction on reading materials would really be 
the straw the broke the camels back. It is illogical to conclude that the 
additional deprivation would be the serum to change prisoners’ ways. 
250 See Brief for the ACLU et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at *19, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 04-1739) 
(referencing M. Keith Chen and Jesse M. Shapiro, Does Prison Harden 
Inmates? A Discontinuity-based Approach (2005), http://www.som.yale.edu/ 
Faculty/keith.chen/papers/prison072405.pdf at 1 (“harsher prison conditions 
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Even if a denial of prisoners’ First Amendment freedoms 
was justified by rehabilitative goals, and seen as logical, 
rational, and reasonable, the Court’s constitutional analysis 
should not stop there. The deferential nature of the Turner test 
should be further checked by an inquiry into whether the 
regulation goes too far, particularly in the present instance, 
where the justification of rehabilitation is all encompassing. This 
idea was first put forth in Procunier v. Martinez251 and is 
echoed in sentiment in the second and fourth parts of the Turner 
test.252 Yet, when the second and fourth factors of Turner were 
applied in Banks, the overwhelming rehabilitative justification 
seemed to swallow their impact and importance.253
To counteract this result, a court must push further. A 
restriction that deprives prisoners’ fundamental right to read 
must be looked at with a narrowed eye.254 Here, even under the 
are associated with significantly more post-release crime”)). 
251 While developing the standard in Procunier, the Court noted that it 
was necessary for prison administrators not only to justify regulations, but 
that they must also “show that [the] regulation . . . furthers one or more of 
the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation.” 
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). This emphasis on the need 
to actually show a relationship between the means and the goal was coupled 
with the Court’s requirement that the limitation “must be no greater than is 
necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest 
involved.” Id. If the restriction was therefore supported by a valid goal but 
“its sweep [was] unnecessarily broad,” the Court would find it went too far. 
Id. at 414.
252 Because the second part of Turner focuses on the available 
alternatives that prisoners have to express their rights, and as the fourth 
prong seeks to ensure that the regulation is not an exaggeration in scope, it is 
clear that Turner is concerned with whether prisoners’ rights are protected 
from overbearing regulations. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91. 
253 This is only emphasized by the fact that the Court explicitly 
recognized that it was not concerned with balancing the various parts of 
Turner. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2579-80 (2006). 
254 The basic civil right of prisoners to be able to read and stay informed 
as to national events is indeed well recognized by both federal and state 
prison regulations. The federal Bureau of Prisons explicitly recognizes that 
prisoners “have the right to a wide range of reading materials for educational 
purposes and for your own enjoyment. These materials may include 
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rehabilitative standard, it is clear that the regulation does go too 
far. There is no proof that the regulation improved the one out 
of four passing rate from Level 2 to Level 1, nor are prisoners 
afforded alternate access to the materials in question. Unlike the 
regulations at hand in Willson, Abbott, and Thompson, safety is 
not the real issue.255
As Banks was decided in a recent term, public 
acknowledgment or backlash is yet to be seen regarding the 
permissibility of such broad restrictions on prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights.256 Nonetheless, so long as the reasoning in 
magazines and newspapers sent from the community, with certain 
restrictions.” See 28 C.F.R. § 541.12 (2007). Although the Supreme Court, 
and courts across the country, have previously found that this right to read 
certain materials is not unlimited, a complete and total ban on certain reading 
materials is very rare. See Brief for the ACLU et. al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at *18, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 
04-1739), at *21 (referencing Corrections Compendium, High Level Security 
Inmates, September 2003, tbl. 4 (only three out of forty-one prisons surveyed 
only allow high security prisoners access to books alone)). Additionally, as 
noted in Procunier, California Penal Code Section 2600 also recognizes the 
importance of the bare fundamental right of prisoners to read and stay 
informed about current events. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 403, n.6. Specifically, 
the California Penal Code ensures prisoners that they will not be deprived 
essential civil rights such as the right to “purchase, receive, and read any and 
all newspapers, periodicals, and books accepted for distribution by the United 
States Post Office.” Cal. Penal Code s2600.
255 The goals put forth in Banks “includ[ed] the need to motivate better 
behavior on the part of particularly difficult prisoners, the need to minimize 
the amount of property they control in their cells, and the need to assure 
prison safety, by, for example, diminishing the amount of material a prisoner 
might use to start a cell fire.” Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2579. So although prison 
officials offered safety as one of the rationales, the Court never actually 
addressed the safety concerns, perhaps because they were irrational in light of 
all of the other permissible items that prisoners were allowed to have in their 
cells. Id. at 2586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256 While it cannot be discounted that there are state penal codes like that 
of California, see, supra n.254, which seek to ensure that prisoners retain 
some of their basic civil rights as far as reading materials are concerned, the 
holding in Banks suggests that the states need not worry themselves over 
affording such protections. Being that the restriction in Banks was approved 
by the Supreme Court, it may actually become less likely for states to initiate 
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Banks stands without revision or input from local legislatures or 
prison administration, the pleasantry of “rehabilitation” will 
allow punishment in disguise. Merely calling torture 
“rehabilitation” could reassure a reviewing court that deprivation 
of fundamental rights is a necessary, positive step. When the 
next inevitable challenge to prison regulations arises, the 
reviewing court will have to decipher what the Supreme Court 
was truly saying in Banks. Unless and until local authorities step 
in to raise the bar in the treatment of prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights, we will have to wait for the Court to clarify 
how far is too far. The Court must recognize the impact of its 
decision, increase the scrutiny established in Procunier, and 
ensure we go no further than necessary in the denial of 
fundamental rights. 
CONCLUSION 
As part of their punishment, prisoners cannot expect that 
they will retain all constitutional freedoms. Yet, we pride 
ourselves as a country that still recognizes prisoners have certain 
inalienable rights, like the right to marry, to read, or 
communicate with others. As such, we carefully monitor how 
and why and when inmates are deprived of their First 
Amendment freedoms; our courts formally recognize the need 
alternative means of expression if one form is denied.257
Over the years, the Supreme Court developed a four-part test 
to analyze challenges to prison regulations that are considered 
too extreme in the deprivation of certain rights.258 When the test 
was first enunciated in Turner, and later applied in subsequent 
cases, it proved to be effective in weighing and balancing the 
similar forms of protection for their inmates if such protection is not seen as 
essential. 
257 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987) (noting that if 
alternative means remain open for the prisoners to exercise the same right, 
then the Court may be more deferential to prison administrators and their 
justifications of the restriction in question). 
258 See, supra, Part I. 
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competing interests of prisoners and administrators.259 The test 
respected the need for prisoners to express themselves, while 
also recognizing the challenges in running correctional facilities. 
However workable the Turner test first seemed, it is no 
longer. When applied in Banks, it became all too obvious that 
the current Supreme Court did not want to get involved in 
overseeing prison administrators or setting limits to correctional 
theories.260 By accepting Pennsylvania’s prison regulation 
prohibiting LTSU Level 2 inmates from having access to 
newspapers, magazines and personal photographs, the Supreme 
Court manipulated Turner to reach its desired outcome. Once 
the Court was told that the regulation was instituted for a 
rational purpose, it glossed over the significance of the other 
factors at play.261 Disposing of Turner’s balancing test, the 
Court provided unprecedented deference in light of the serious 
deprivation involved. Accepting the administrations’ justification 
that prisoners should have limited access to reading materials to 
encourage better behavior and reduce the threat of violent or 
destructive behavior, the Court rolled over, leaving room for the 
great possibility that any fundamental right could be acceptably 
denied if justified by rehabilitation. 
In light of the freedoms involved, and the deprivations 
already imposed on prisoners, there must be a change in the way 
in which such regulations are reviewed. If the purpose behind a 
regulation is said to encourage rehabilitation, or justified because 
of its theory that deprivation makes one better, the reviewing 
court must ask for clear correlation between purpose and effect. 
Further, there must be increased scrutiny to ensure the 
regulation does no more than what is absolutely necessary to 
accomplish the stated goal. Otherwise, simply justifying any 
restriction as rehabilitative could easily lead to a system where 
259 See, supra, Part II. 
260 See Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2580-82 (2006) (finding that the 
evidentiary burden of the justification was met even though the Secretary had 
only submitted a statement and deposition in support of the regulation). 
261 See id. at 2580 (admitting the second, third and fourth factors were 
irrelevant so long as policy is deemed logical and whether means show 
reasonable relation). 
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prisoners retain no fundamental rights. While continuing to 
respect prison administrators and their intimate knowledge of the 
system, if the connection between the regulation and the desired 
effect is too attenuated, deference should not overwhelm our 
better judgment. However, until the Supreme Court again has 
the opportunity to address such concerns and to recalibrate the 
weighing of deference against rationality, local legislatures, 
prison administrators, and the public should expect more: that 
the most fundamental rights remain respected, regardless if we 
are criminal or not. 
 
